Review status — EslaM-X/coreguard · Gate 4.1 · CoreGuard Assurance Platform · engine 2.1.2
A complete visual brief of the authoritative state: what was built, what the hashes prove, who decides, and why a Mainnet broadcast remains NOT AUTHORIZED even though every test passes.
Evidence flows upward; authorization flows downward only through an explicit human signature at every gate. No layer can grant itself permission.
The v4.2.2-remediation cycle resolved the three blocking findings — each fix shown as before/after with inspectable evidence.
The freeze record pins a SHA-256 for every file, from disk, at a moment in time. Its binding rule: any edit after capture — even documentation — voids the freeze and demands a new cycle. Every "did the bytes change?" dispute is therefore settled with a single command.
The displayed content = the real cast hash. The button flips a single nibble and recomputes SHA-256 (in your browser) exactly as the verifier does on disk.
| Field | Value / meaning |
|---|---|
| recordId / releaseId | cg41-freeze-record-4.2.6 · 4.2.6-overhaul — supersedes 4.2.5 |
| frozenAtUtc | 2026-09-18T09:31:01Z — after capture, no edits; the sole exception: re-pinning the README hash after an edit (documented, timestamp preserved) |
| sha256.releaseFiles + quarantineFiles | 27 + 19 = 46 entries — entry shape: {file:"README.md", sha256:"0xba265f10…", bytes:1402} |
| excluded | exactly one — the record itself (self-referential); verified by a disk ↔ archive comparison |
| cycleEvidence | selftest 21/21 · negative 16/16 (precond=0) · validator 649 · a determinism proof (regeneration = byte-identical) · clean clone BLOCKED |
| decision | CONDITIONAL NO-GO — C7=PARTIAL C8=PENDING C9=PENDING; … = NOT AUTHORIZED |
| gitCommit | present — pinning is commit-anchored (gitCommit = 2cdda4f2…) · the --disk mode is diagnostics only, never evidence |
A binding contract for engine 2.1.2 — developed after a negative scenario was found to "silently lose its precondition" while success was still being announced.
| Status | Meaning | Counts as success in a mandatory negative scenario? |
|---|---|---|
| PASS | The condition genuinely held, with evidence | in expect-pass cases only |
| FAIL | A violation was caught by a closed check | Yes — that is the goal in expect-fail |
| BLOCKED | Could not proceed, blocker documented | Yes — provided the blocker is documented |
| INCONCLUSIVE | Insufficient evidence to judge | No |
| NOT_APPLICABLE | Not applicable, with a documented reason | No — ever (the old Scenario 9 defect) |
| PRECONDITION_FAILURE | A mandatory precondition was absent | Fails the whole cycle: exit 1 |
Command text comes from the packet itself (packet 1.2.0) — each command is a single element that copies whole with one click (hashes at the full 64 hex chars, no ellipses, no wrapped lines). The last line is behavior display only and cannot be copied.
one-byte edit · wrong hash · missing file · tampered manifest / mismatched hash (NEG-wrong-manifest-hash)
a method outside the allow-list · the send verb · an empty list (the closed POL-002 catalog)
double spawn · dynamic invocation (scriptblocks/members)
cast outside the trust root · cast missing · insufficient permissions
duplicate IDs · a report edited after creation · a stale policy / mismatched hash · a tampered drift map (14)
This is the meta-proof that the governance works: no cycle ended without revealing something that would have gone unseen without the rule "any unexplained difference halts the cycle". All dates are 2026-09-18.
The H1–H8 matrix (packet 1.2.0) — each item is an evidence binding that the reviewer verifies from disk personally, then signs. A signature closes C8 only and grants no broadcast GO — the owner decision (C9) is separate by construction.
| Item | What it binds | Reference hash | Signature / date |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | Engine v2.1.2 — after the SELF-002 fix (exec=0 net=0 dyn=0) and the PRECONDITION_FAILURE semantics | recomputed from disk | —— awaiting —— |
| H2 | The standard run report: 33/33 PASS · VERIFIED-READONLY-ONLY · ENV-003 inside trust · LEG-001 clean | 0xffb7b589…7a1c (46,812B) | —— awaiting —— |
| H3 | The self-test TAP 21/21 (includes ST21, guarding against future execution sites) | 0x1ebf06fa…2209 (705B) | —— awaiting —— |
| H4 | The negative suite 16/16 fail-closed · precond=0 — after removing cosmetic 15 (its coverage: 14) | re-derived from disk (regenerated on 2.1.2) | —— awaiting —— |
| H5 | The approved evidence manifest v4.2.2 — 8/8 MATCH with orig|quarantine pairs (proof of byte preservation in quarantine) | 0x73649ed3…e0dc (1,033B) | —— awaiting —— |
| H6 | The V06-2 closure: cast path · SHA-256 · version 1.8.0 · official source · sole PATH entry · the documented absence of an Authenticode signature | 0xeba3df69…91b36 (58,801,152B) | —— awaiting —— |
| H7–H8 | The remaining packet items (completed at the actual reviewer handoff — not detailed here, to avoid claiming beyond what is proven) | ||
The gates were executed under the disclosed single-operator mode (GOVERNANCE-MODE.md + GOVERNANCE-RECORDS.md): every record carries a mandatory disclosure header, a named approval source, and an empty upgrade slot — the first independent human signature upgrades the record to full independence with zero rework.
The DDE/1 layer adds a payment gate on top of verified execution: a platform holds a payout until two independent conditions hold — the evidence record is admissible (DDE/1, ten fail-closed checks) and a signed acceptance record rests on criterion evaluations. A settled transaction satisfies neither half alone.
Two conditions, both required: engine VERIFIED (admissible evidence) + party ACCEPTED (signed acceptance citing criteria). One-sided payment facts — even a settled on-chain transaction — hold the funds and name their reasons.
F0–F3 (records, separation, criteria closure, lifecycle) · E3–E5 (integrity replay, authorization binding, consent) · B1–B3 (no payment inference, execution never decides conformity, no engine adjudication). Every report quotes the boundary verbatim.
VERIFIED + EXECUTION_EVIDENCE_ADMISSIBLE — CONFORMITY_UNDECIDED_BY_ENGINE: the evidence is admissible and the engine has not judged the delivery. Conformity is decided by the parties, in a separate acceptance or dispute record — never silently from chain facts.
| Item | Evidence | Impact if addressed | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commit-anchored freeze record (closed) | Closed in the 4.2.6 cycle: gitCommit pinned, and the verifier hashes from the commit tree (git show), not the disk — detection adversarially tested (10 scenarios) | Every claim verifies with one command and resolves to an immutable tree — the "did the bytes change after the freeze?" class that consumed two cycles is structurally dead | minutes |
| External evidence not machine-defined | reviews-extra is absent from the record (text scan: false) — the Option B document was pruned away | A requiredExternalEvidence matrix (path + hash + source) turns Option B from prose into an inspectable contract | low |
| CI does not run the assurance cycle | ci.yml: npm test only — the SelfTest / negative suite / validator run manually | A CI step for the environment-independent branch + a determinism re-proof on every push: evidence monitored continuously, not momentarily | medium |
| JSON generated via PowerShell 5.1 | CP1252 mojibake struck twice by the same mechanism (the 4.2.4 / 4.2.6 cycles) — the engine is 1,013 lines of PS | A Node generator beside validate-report.mjs kills the defect class for good (PS for checking, Node for data) | hours |
| Gate states duplicated across 4 documents | The C7/C8/C9 text lives in STATUS, the README, the record's decision, and the packet tail | A single gates.json source consumed by the validator, the README, and the HTML board (generated, never handwritten) | half a day |
| Push & archive verification (closed) | HEAD = origin/main = fa15eb2 · a clean tree · the real GitHub archive (main.tar.gz) matches the pins 46/46 | The triangle's amber edge closed by actual measurement — nothing left open on it | done |